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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEAN W. CROWTHER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs. 
Utah Court of Appeals # 940228-CA 
BRYAN MOWER, 
District Court #920905365 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Statement of the Issues: 
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals court should reverse Summary Judgement in this case 
since a companion case (Crowther v. Mower, No. 930446-CA, Utah App. June 9^  1994) was 
ruled in Appellant's favor and petition for Writ of Certiorari by Appellee (Utah Supreme 
Court No. 940354, October 19, 1994) was denied. This case was identical to the Salt Lake 
County case and involved property in Summit County. The ruling by Judge David S. Young 
involved and included the same issues and opinions as in this case. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment when 
there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether Appellant's mother intended to 
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presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she sent via certified mail from Utah to Appellant 
while he was in California, and that such deed was on its face an absolute conveyance, in 
light of the fact that if a factfinder ruled that there was a present intent to transfer the deed on 
her part, this would have had the legal effect of destroying the joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship that Appellant's mother held with Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and 
Appellee tenants in common with respect to the property, and terminate the possibility that 
Appellee would take the entire property through Appellee's former right of survivorship when 
Appellant's mother died. 
3. Whether the trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a grantee 
does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the property that is the 
subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship until 
the deed is recorded. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The standard of review for whether a summary judgment was properly granted (and 
which is therefore, the standard of review for #1 and 2) is explained in Rule 56 of Utah Code 
Unannotated page 151. (1993) " . . . the party against whom the judgment has been granted is 
entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the necessary inferences fairly arising 
therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to him." Case law on this matter is equally 
clear: "On review of a grant of summary judgment to a Plaintiff, the inquiry is whether there 
is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Thorncock v. Cook, 604 Rd 934 (Utah 1979). "In 
reviewing the trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in the light most 
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favorable to the losing party. Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, we 
may reconsider the trial court's legal conclusions." Winegar y_. Froerer Corp., 813 P.d 104 
(Utah 1991) (citing Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.d 1241, 
1243 (Utah 1990). 
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Nature of the Case 
This is a case involving Applellee's deceased wife, Nellie Crowther, who while still 
living, destroyed that couple's joint tenancy with right of survivorship when she duly 
conveyed and delivered her interest to the land in question in this action by means of a 
quitclaim deed to her son, Mr. Mower (Defendant). By doing this, she created a tenancy in 
common by Mr. Mower and Plaintiff, which has no rights of survivorship. Plaintiff claims 
the quitclaim deed was invalid due to invalid delivery, which is essential in deed transactions. 
Course of Proceedings 
Appellee filed a complaint in Third District Court of Salt Lake County. Plaintiff then 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings with a supporting memorandum on 
or about April 14, 1993. Defendant thereafter, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a 
memorandum in support thereof on or about April 28, 1993.. Oral argument before Judge 
Leslie A. Lewis took place on January 14, 1994 . Judge Lewis entered Summary Judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff, ruling that the deed in question was invalid because appellant did not 
record the deed until after Mrs. Crowther's death. 
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to reconsider attorney's 
fees on or about February 4, 1994. . Defendant filed motion for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on or about February 10, 1994. Judge Lewis did not respond to either 
motion. . This appeal was thereafter filed. 
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Facts 
1 . Defendant Mower is the only son of Nellie D. Crowther who died on August 9, 1991 
2. Plaintiff was married to Nellie D. Crowther at the time of her death and was living 
with her husband, Dean W. Crowther in Salt Lake City, Utah.. 
3. On December 15, 1988, Nellie Crowther signed a quitclaim deed conveying her 
interest in property located in Salt Lake County, to wit: 
Lot 7, Bolck 1, ROCKWOOD SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
to her son, Bryan D. Mower, who at the time was living in Simi Valley, California. The 
deed was witnessed by her friend, Mable Hammond, and sent via certified mail to Mr. 
Mower along with a letter from Mrs. Crowther's attorney and a codicil to Mrs. Crowther's 
original will detailing her action of the quitclaim deed. 
4. The quitclaim deed was recorded in Salt Lake County on August 12, 1991 with the 
Salt Lake County Recorder by Bryan Mower, subsequent to Nellie Crowther's Death. 
Summary of Arguments 
1. The appeals court should reverse Summary Judgement in this case since a 
companion case (Crowther v. Mower, No. 930446-CA, Utah App. June 9^  1994) was ruled in 
Appellant's favor and petition for Writ of Certiorari by Appellee (Utah Supreme Court No. 
940354, October 19, 1994) was denied. This case was identical to the Salt Lake County case 
and involved property in Summit County. The ruling by Judge David S. Young involved and 
included the same issues, facts, laws and opinions as in this case. 
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2. The trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment 
because there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether Appellant's mother intended 
to presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she sent via certified mail from Utah to her son, 
Mr. Mower, while he was in California. On its face, the deed conveyed absolute ownership 
of the therein mentioned property to her son, Mr. Mower. Only a factfinder's ruling that no 
valid delivery took place could cause the conveyance of the deed to be found invalid. 
(If the deed were ruled to be duly delivered, the deed would have the legal effect of 
destroying the joint tenancy with right of survivorship that Appellant's mother held with 
Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and Appellee tenants in common with respect to 
the property, and terminate the possibility that Appellee would take the entire property 
through Appellee's former right of survivorship when Appellant's mother died.) 
3. The trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a 
grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the property that is 
the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship 
until the deed is recorded. The trial court's application of Utah's recording law was plain 
error. 
Detail of Argument 
Point 1 
The Companion Case in Summit County Ruled by this Court 
Makes this Case a Moot Point 
The Utah Court of Appeals opinion (Exhibit A) was clear on all points of issue 
involving Appellee's claims and subsequent judges opinion. According to the opinion, "Mrs. 
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Crowther had no interest in the property at the time of her death, having trasferred her 
interest to [Mr.] Mower, and Crowther's ownership interest had already changed from a joint 
tenancy to a tenacy in common." (Crowther v. Mower, SEE Exhibit A, Page 4) In addition, 
the court stated that the fact Mower delayed recording the quitclaim deed " does not affect 
its validity as between him and his mother." (SEE Page 5) The court went on to say: "the 
fact a deed is not recorded or that recording is delayed does not affect the validity of a 
document with respect to the parties to the document and all other persons." (Utah Code Ann. 
57-1-13) 
The court also ruled that the deed itself was unambiguous and the letter from Mrs. 
Crowther's Attorney, Paul Wharton, along with Mrs. Crowther's Codicil to her will clearly 
supports Mrs. Crowther's intent to deliver and convey her interest in the properties in 
question. The court stated: "we determine that, as a matter of law, the evidence is 
uncontroverted that at the time Mrs. Crowther had the deed(s) delivered, she had the present 
intent to convey the Property(s)." The court reversed the summary judgment and entered 
judgment in favor of Mr. Mower. A subsequent Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed by 
the Appellee along with a opposition to petition by the Appellant. The petition was denied on 
October 19, 1994. 
The case above is identical to this case. Both the Summit County and Salt Lake 
County deeds were sent to Mr. Mower via certified mail at the same time. Since this case is 
so similar in nature, content, opinions and results, the case should be decided by this court 
summarily in favor of the Appellant. 
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Detail of Argument 
Point 2 
A Trial Court's Granting of Summary Judgment 
is Improper When a Dispute to a Material Fact Exists 
The trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment because 
there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether Appellant's mother intended to 
presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she sent via certified mail from Utah to her son, Mr. 
Mower, while he was in California. On its face, the deed conveyed absolute ownership of the 
therein mentioned property to her son, Mr. Mower. Only a factfinder's ruling that no valid 
delivery took place could cause the conveyance of the deed to be found invalid. 
(If the deed were ruled to be effectively delivered, the deed would have the legal 
effect of destroying the joint tenancy with right of survivorship that Appellant's mother held 
with Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and Appellee tenants in common with respect 
to the property, and terminate the possibility that Appellee would take the entire property 
through Appellee's former right of survivorship when Appellant's mother died.) 
The Supreme Court of Utah, on at least two occasions, has clearly stated that a 
grantor's intent to deliver a deed is not one of law, rather one of fact. In Horton v. 
Horton, 695 P.d 102, 106 (Utah 1984) the Court ruled: Delivery or its absence is a question 
of fact." See also: Poulson v. Poulson, 672 Rd 97, 99 (Utah 1983). In light of these rulings 
by the Utah Supreme Court, the trial judge was clearly wrong by granting summary judgment 
on the factual issue concerning Nellie Crowther's intent to transfer ownership when she 
conveyed her property to her son, Mr. Mower. 
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Nellie Crowther, Mr. Mower's mother, delivered a deed to Mr. Mower via certified 
mail that gave all her interest in the property described therein to Mr. Mower. However, 
Appellee wants to have this conveyance ruled void for what he claims was a lack of Nellie 
Crowther's intent to deliver the deed to Mr. Mower, again, a factual issue. 
Mr. Mower asserts the facts cleary indicate Mrs. Crowther's intent to convey and 
deliver the deed(s) to her son for the following reasons: 
1. The deed was absolute on its face. And the deed is the best means available to establish 
the parties' intent. Sweeny v. Sweeny, 11 A ^ 806 (Conn. 1940). Also the deed was 
executed before the letter from Nellie Crowther's attorney was even written. 
2. The letter sent to Mr. Mower (Exhibit B) by Nellie Crowther's attorney, also says, "Acting 
upon your mother's request I am forwarding the two deeds to you, to complete the 
transaction by which she transfers ownership to you. The return receipt will show that 
you have received the two deeds, in case any question of delivery should ever arise." 
(Emphasis added.) See Exhibit B paragraph 3.) 
3. Mrs. Crowther stated in her own codicil to her will: "I have by quitclaim deed given to 
my son one-half interest of my home and other real property." (SEE Exhibit C) 
There was clearly a dispute between what the Appellee and the judge thought Nellie 
Crowther's intent was, and what Mr. Mower thought it was. The Judge seems to have 
blinding gone along with Appellee's initial remarks that the intent of Nellie Crowther was 
undisputed and not material—initial remarks which were simply ludicrous. In addition, the 
judge accepted a partial transcript of the Summit County case (SEE transcript, Page 7) which 
was under appeal at the time and Judge Lewis obviously used this as a precedent case and 
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used Judge Young's opinion for her ruling. Nellie Crowther's intent to transfer ownership 
was very much disputed as established by Mr. Mower's reasons above. 
Moreover, by reading the judge's ruling, it is obvious that the judge's granting of 
summary judgment turned on the judge's determination that Nellie Crowther had no intent to 
deliver the deed to Mr. Mower, her son. Therefore, because the granting of the motion of 
summary judgment turned on this issue, it was certainly a material fact. 
The summary judgment turned on an issue of fact, not of law, therefore, the granting 
of the motion for summary judgment should be overruled because in order for a nonmoving 
party to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment and send the issue to a 
factfinder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for 
the nonmoving party to show facts that controvert those of the moving party's. Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P.d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Summary judgment 
is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions . . . show there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). It has been established that the intent of Nellie Crowther was 
disputed and material. 
Point 3 
Recording of a Deed Only Imparts 
Notice of Claim 
The trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a grantee does 
not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the property that is the subject of 
the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is 
recorded. 
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Judge Lewis was wrong because when Nellie Crowther died, the interest she held 
with Appellee as joint tenants with rights of survivorship terminated when she conveyed her 
interest in the property to her son, Mr. Mower. The law on this area is very clear and well 
rooted in American jurisprudence. A joint tenancy with right of survivorship is created when 
there is unity of time, title, interest and possession exist. Merrick v. Peterson, 606 P.d 700 
(Wash App. 1980). However, "Conveyance by one joint tenant of his or her interest severs 
joint tenancy, transforming it into tenancy in common, thereby extinguishing right of 
survivorship." Lyon v. Lyon, 670 Rd 272 (Wash. 1983); Jolley v. Corry, 671 Rd 139 (Utah 
1983). 
Judge Lewis stated in her ruling that: "...while a presumption of valid delivery arises 
where a deed has been executed and recorded, here it is clear that recording did not occur 
until several days after Mrs. Crowther's death. By the time of this recording, title had already 
passed to the surviving joint tenant, Mr. Crowther, the Plaintiff." Judge Lewis was wrong. 
When Nellie Crowther conveyed her interest to her son, Mr. Mower, by a quitclaim deed that 
was absolute on its face as to giving him all her interest, Appellee's joint tenancy and right of 
survivorship was destroyed. Mr. Mower had become a tenant in common with Appellee 
when he was conveyed the property, two and 1/2 years before Nellie Crowther even died. 
This is true even though the deed was not recorded by Mr. Mower until after Nellie 
Crowther's death. "The intention of recording acts is to require persons claiming an interest 
in real property to record such interests as will give notice of their claims." Chelan County v. 
Wilson, 744 P.d 1106 (Wash App. 1987). This decision goes on to state " . . . unrecorded 
conveyances are valid as between parties." 
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This point is well entrenched in the United States common law: "It is the rule with 
deeds as in the case of other instruments affecting the tile to land, that a deed, otherwise 
valid, passes title from the grantor to the grantee although it has not been recorded."1 The 
execution and delivery of a deed passes the estate and interest in the premises, the same as 
livery of seisin at common law.2 Recording adds nothing to its effectiveness as a 
conveyance; all that it accomplishes is to impart notice, and after its acceptance, failure to 
record the deed will not revest title in the grantor.3 Despite diligent and exhaustive efforts by 
Mr. Mower to find authority for the Court's ruling, no Utah case law or statutory authority 
has been found that points up to the proposition that the conveyance from Nellie Crowther to 
Mr. Mower should be ruled void because Mr. Mower did not record the conveyance until 
after the death of his mother, Nellie Crowther. 
Utah law is very clear that one who conveys an interest in property by quitclaim deed 
conveys "all right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and to the premises therein 
described and all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of such 
conveyance." Utah Code Annotated section 57-1-13 (1992 edition). Had the legislature 
wanted to limit the validity of transfers by quitclaim deed to only those quitclaim-deed 
transfers that were subsequently recorded, the legislature had the ability to do so. They did 
not; creating, at least, the implication that they did not want recordation to be a condition 
^an field v. Excelsior Ref. Co. , 135 U.S. 326; Burbank v. 
Conrad, 96 U.S. 291; Warnock v. Harlow, 96 Cal 298, 31 P 166; 
Hallett v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 114 P 490. All of this is 
still good law. They have all been Shepardized. 
2See 23 Am Jur d, Deeds sections 76 et seq. 
3Lake v. Weaver, 74 A 451; J.C. Engelman Land Co. v. La 
Blanco Agri. Co., 239 SW 937, 21 A.L.R. 1535. 
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upon quitclaim transfers. 
This general principle of conveyances binding the parties to the transaction even if 
they are not subsequently recorded is well stated in Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist 
Church of Beryl Iron County, 642 P.d 371 (Utah 1982). "A conveyance of real property is 
valid and binding between parties even without recordation." Therefore, the unrecorded 
transfer by Nellie Crowther to her son, Appellant, Bryan Mower, is valid even though Bryan 
Mower did not record the transfer until his mother, Nellie Crowther, died. 
Moreover, Appellee asserted that Mr. Bryan Mower should not be awarded the 
property conveyed to him by quitclaim deed because there was an invalid delivery from 
Bryan Mower's mother to Bryan Mower. However, Appellee errs in this assertion. The deed 
that Nellie Crowther conveyed to Mr. Mower, her son, was absolute on its face: "Nellie D. 
Crowther grantor . . . hereby quitclaims to Bryan Mower grantee " • . .Lot 7, Block 1, 
ROCKWOOD SUBDIVISION." Nellie Crowther also had the deed witnessed and notarized 
by a Utah notary public. ("Exhibit D" hereto attached.) The moment she did this and sent her 
son, Bryan Mower, the deed, her interest in the above-described property ended, severing the 
joint tenancy with right of survivorship held by her and Appellee. By giving her son a deed 
that conveyed absolute ownership of all her interest in the questioned property on its face, 
Utah law recognized Bryan Mower as the sole owner of her former interest. Utah Code 
Annotated 57-1-13. And the joint tenancy with right of survivorship ended. The deed 
clearly passed beyond Nellie Crowther's "control or domain" as required by Utah law in order 
for there to be a valid delivery. Wiggle v. Cheney, 597 Rd 1351, 1352 (Utah 1979). 
Wiggle is one of Appellee's primary cited authorities. However, a look at the facts 
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clearly indicate Wiggle is not on point and supports Mr. Bryan Mower's assertion that title 
indeed passed because a valid delivery was effected. In Wiggle, the Court held that where, 
following disposition of deed, grantor advised her executor that his name was on a safe 
deposit box and instructed him that upon her death, he was to go to the bank where he would 
be granted access to the safe deposit box and its contents, grantor remained in sole possession 
and control in deed in question until her death and, thus, subsequent manual delivery of deed 
by executor to grantee conveyed no title to property described therein, or any part thereof, or 
any of its contents. These facts are a far cry from the case at hand: Nellie Crowther had a 
quitclaim deed notarized, and witnessed, then sent the deed to her son, Mr. Mower, by 
certified mail to ensure it would be duly delivered. She lived in Utah at the time and so 
mailing the deed was the only way to deliver it to Mr. Mower, in California. She used the 
best possible delivery means available to her under the circumstances short of paying 
someone to fly to California and hand deliver the deed. After this delivery of the quitclaim 
deed that by its terms conveys absolutely all her ownership in the property, she retained no 
right to "reclaim or recall" her property interest, which is all she was required to do to effect 
a valid delivery. Hanns v. Hanns, 423 P.d 499, 509 (Oregon 1967). 
Had Nellie Crowther wanted to maintain control over the property until she died, she 
certainly could have deposited the deed with an escrow agent, which is what many people do 
when they want to ensure conditions are satisfied before deliver occurs. Chillemi v. Chillemi, 
78 A.2d 750 (Md. 1951). Even preferred, she could have written the ostensible "conditions" 
right in the deed itself, insuring complete control until she died, which she chose not to do. 
Mrs. Crowther's intent was clear and because the deed was not recorded until 
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subsequent to Mrs. Crowther's death does not, according to law, affect the validity of the 
deed. 
Conclusion 
The court clearly erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a grantee does 
not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the property which is the subject 
of the deed in question, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship 
until the deed in recorded. Utah law is very clear that one who conveys and interest in 
property by quitclaim deed conveys "all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and to 
the premises therein." Recording only serves notice. 
Mrs. Crowther's intent was to leave her interest in the property as indcated by the 
deed, the letter from Mr. Wharton (Mrs. Crowther's attorney) and her own codicil (Exibit C) 
to her will. 
Thsi court should, as in the companion case in Summit County, give full force and 
effect to all provisions of the Utah Laws, cited above, and reverse the District Court's original 
decision and rule summarily for the Appellant. 
day of October, 1994. 
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Certificate of Service 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
Appellant Bryan D. Mower appeals from a final summary 
judgment, ordering him to quit claim interest in a parcel of real 
property in favor of appellee Dean W. Crowther. We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTS 
Nellie Crowther, Crowther's wife and Mower's mother, owned 
in joint tenancy with Crowther, a parcel of real property (the 
Property), in Summit County, where the Crowthers resided. 
On December 15, 1988, Mrs. Crowther executed a quit claim 
deed conveying her interest in the Property to her son Mower, who 
was living in Simi Valley, California. Mrs. Crowther's attorney, 
W. Paul Wharton, sent the quit claim deed, together with a copy 
of a codicil to Mrs. Crowther's will, to Mower via certified 
mail. 
In Wharton's letter of transmittal, dated December 16, 1988, 
he noted that he was including the quit claim deed, along with a 
deed for another parcel of property. He stated, "Acting ut m 
your Mother's request, I am forwarding the two Deeds to yc . to 
complete the transaction by which she transfers ownership D you* 
The Return Receipt will show that you have received the t* 
Deeds, in case any question of delivery should ever arise • He 
also stated, "please keep this letter . . . as an indica-.on of 
your Mother's intention to deliver the deeds and how tha.; was 
accomplished." Earlier in the letter, he stated, 
As you know, your Mother wanted to be 
sure that you receive a 1/2 interest in her 
property; her intention is to leave the other 
1/2 to her step-children. There are two 
possible chain of events—either your Mother 
dies before her husband does, or she dies 
after he does. If she dies first, you should 
promptly, as soon as it is possible, record 
the two deeds with the respective County 
Recorder. If your step-father dies first, I 
would suggest you contact me (after you've 
discussed matters with your Mother). 
Mrs. Crowther's codicil, signed December 14, 1988, stated "I 
have by Quit-claim Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and 
other real property." 
Mrs. Crowther died August 9, 1991, while still married to 
Crowther. Six days later, on August 15, 1991, Mower recorded the 
quit claim deed. 
Crowther instituted a quiet title action against Mower 
claiming that the deed did not terminate the joint tenancy 
because of Mower's failure to record the deed prior to Mrs. 
Crowther's death. Crowther claimed that, upon Mrs. Crowther's 
death, the Property vested in him by reason of survivorship. 
Neither party disputed that the deed was delivered, nor did they 
claim that the quit claim deed was ambiguous on its face. Both 
parties moved for summary judgment and for attorney fees. Mower, 
although he initially appeared pro se, requested fees incurred 
for "bonds and various consulting charges." 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Crowther. The minute entry reveals only that the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Crowther and that attorney fees 
would be awarded. The summary judgment, entered April 14, 1993, 
stated that the court found "no material uncontroverted facts" 
and that Crowther was entitled to attorney fees. The court 
declared the quit claim deed to be "null and void and of no force 
or effect whatsoever." The court then awarded Crowther $1300 in 
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 
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Mower moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment. 
The court denied the motion and made another minute entry 
stating, "The court has found that [Mrs. Crowther] did not have 
such present intent to [convey] as evidenced by the instructions 
from counsel . . . . The court has found that there was lacking 
a present intent to sever the joint tenancy and thus the later 
filing of the deed was ineffective to convey an interest to 
[Mower] .fl 
After judgment was entered, Mower moved for reconsideration 
of the attorney fees award. The court denied this motion, making 
the following minute entry: "The Court has been concerned with 
the plethora of irrelevant and spurious documents filed by 
[Mower] in this matter." 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Wineqar 
v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). "In reviewing 
the trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in 
the light most favorable to the losing party. Because summary 
judgment is granted as a matter of law, we may reconsider the 
trial court's legal conclusions." Wineqar, 813 P.2d at 107. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Dissolution of Joint Tenancy 
When a joint tenant makes "a bona fide conveyance of his 
interest in property to a third party, . . . this has the effect 
of terminating the joint tenancy, and converting the ownership 
into a tenancy in common." Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594, 596 
(Utah 1979); accord Clearfield State Bank v. Centos, 562 P.2d 
622, 624-25 (Utah 1977); Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 301 
P. 2d 1086, 1090 (Utah 1956) (joint tenant who conveys or 
mortgages real property terminates joint tenancy and creates 
tenancy in common). 
"[EJither party to a joint tenancy may terminate it . . . 
and . . . the consent of the other tenants to the severance or 
termination is not required." 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 16 at 
343 (1981); accord Nelson. 592 P.2d at 596, 597; Clearfield State 
Bank, 562 P.2d at 624-25. 
The valid conveyance itself destroys the joint tenancy, and 
a joint tenant need not notify the other tenant or record the 
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conveyance. See Burke v. Stevens, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90-91 (Cal. 
App. 1968) ("It was unnecessary in connection with the execution 
of such a deed that there should be notification to the other 
joint tenant and unnecessary that the deed be recorded; neither 
acknowledgment or recordation is necessary."); 48A C.J.S. Joint 
Tenancy § 17 at 345. 
"Survivorship is the distinctive characteristic or major 
incident of an estate in joint tenancy." 48A C.J.S. Joint 
Tenancy § 3 at 3 02. However, survivorship is an expectancy and 
not a future interest because a joint tenant has but a 
"conditional opportunity of becoming the owner of the whole 
interest." Estate of Breckon Ty. Tax ComiR'n, 591 P. 2d 442, 443 
(Utah 1979). 
"The effect of a severance by a joint tenant is to terminate 
the incident of survivorship as between him and the other joint 
tenants." 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 19 at 351 (citing Tracy-
Collins, 301 P.2d at 1090); accord 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and 
Joint Ownership §§ 14 & 16 at 108, 109 (1965). 
Accordingly, Mrs. Crowther had no interest in the Property 
at the time of her death, having transferred her interest to 
Mower, and Crowther's ownership interest had already changed from 
a joint tenancy to a tenancy in common. 
II. Effect of Failure to Record 
Crowther argues that Mrs. Crowther did not convey her 
interest because Mower failed to record the deed prior to her 
death, or alternatively, that Mrs. Crowther did not intend to 
transfer her interest. We disagree. 
A quit claim deed, "when executed as required by law shall 
have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest and 
estate of the grantor in and to "Che premises therein described 
and all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
at the date of such conveyance." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 
(1994). The fact that such a deed is not recorded or that 
recording is delayed "does not affect the validity of a document 
with respect to the parties to the document and all other persons 
who have notice of the document." Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2(3). 
In fact, Utah's recording laws "do not make recordation a 
prerequisite to the validity of a deed." Greaerson v. Jensen, 
669 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983) (unrecorded deed valid against 
interest of subsequent buyers who failed to record their own 
interest); Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 14 P. 338, 339 (Utah 1887) 
(unrecorded conveyance valid between parties and to all parties 
having actual notice), aff'd. 142 U.S. 241, 12 S. Ct. 158 (1891). 
Nor is compliance with the recording statute necessarily a 
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prerequisite to enforcing the terms of the deed. Larson v. 
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Utah App. 1991); 
cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). 
On the other hand, an unrecorded deed is void against a 
subsequent purchaser who purchases in good faith and for valuable 
consideration and who first duly records the deed. Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-3-3; see Herman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah 
App. 1987) (grantor has no duty to record, while grantee has 
option to record or assume risk of subsequent grantee acquiring 
superior rights by recordation). A joint tenant does not, by 
reason of that status, qualify as a good faith purchaser for 
purposes of the recording statute. 
Thus, a conveyance is valid when the grantor, with present 
intent to convey, delivers the deed. Wineqar v. Froerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104, 110 (Utah 1991); Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635 
(Utah 1984). Recordation is immaterial in determining whether a 
conveyance has terminated a joint tenancy. See Burke v. Stevens, 
70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90-91 (Cal. App. 1968); 48A C.J.S. Joint 
Tenancy § 17 at 345 (1981). 
Here, the fact that Mower delayed recording the quit claim 
deed does not affect its validity as between him and his mother, 
and Crowther is not a subsequent purchaser. Utah Code Ann. § 57-
3-2(3). Thus, the fact that Mower delayed recording the deed is 
irrelevant to Crowther7s claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3. 
III. Intent of Grantor 
A conveyance is valid upon delivery of a deed with present 
intent to transfer. Wineqar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 110 
(Utah 1991); Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984). 
"If the contract is in writing and the language is not 
ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from 
the words of the agreement." Wineqar, 813 P.2d at 108. "A court 
may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful 
consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain." 
Id. 
Here, neither party claims the language of the quit claim 
deed is ambiguous. Moreover, the language of the codicil 
supports Mrs. Crowther's intent to convey: "I have by Quit-claim 
Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and other real 
property." 
Wharton's letter also supports Mrs. Crowther's intent to 
convey under the quit claim deed. The letter stated that Wharton 
was forwarding the deed "to complete the transaction by which she 
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transfers ownership to you." The letter stated that one of its 
purposes was to indicate "your Mother's intention to deliver the 
deeds and how that was accomplished." 
The language of the quit claim deed supports a conclusion 
that the quit claim deed is unambiguous as a matter of law. We 
determine that, as a matter of law, the evidence is 
uncontroverted that at the time Mrs. Crowther had the deed 
delivered, she had the present intent to convey the Property. We 
therefore remand for entry of judgment dismissing Crowther's 
complaint with prejudice and granting Mower such relief as may be 
necessary to effectuate the validity of Mrs. Crowther's quit 
claim deed. 
IV. Attorney Fees 
Mower claims the court erred as a matter of law in awarding 
attorney fees in favor of Crowther pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11. 
Rule 11 provides: 
The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certification by him that he 
has read the pleading, motion, or other 
paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. 
Rule 11 provides that when a pleading is signed in violation of 
the Rule, the court shall impose a reasonable attorney fee. 
Given our determination that Mower's position at trial was 
warranted by existing law, we must likewise reverse the trial 
court's attorney fee award and refuse to award Crowther attorney 
fees on appeal. 
Crowther's arguments on appeal were "warranted by existing 
law" to the extent they were based on an outstanding order of a 
trial judge. See Rimensburcrer v. Rimensburaer, 841 P.2d 709, 712 
(Utah App. 1992). Thus, we do not award Mower attorney fees on 
appeal. 
930446-CA 6 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the summary judgment and remand with instructions 
to enter judgment in favor of Mower and to enforce the terms of 
Mrs. Crowther's quit claim deed. We also reverse the trial 
courts award of attorney fees and award Crowther no attorney 
f ees^0TT"abpeal. 
Jamerk/Z. DavTsT^3udge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SECTION III IN WHICH I CONCUR IN 
RESULT ONLY: 
Gregorv^K. Orme, Judge 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
124 SOUTH 400 EAST • 4TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 328-8891 
WATS 1-800-662-4245 
December 16, 1988 
Bryan Mower 
1564 Acapulco Crt. 
Simi Valley, California 
Dear Mr. Mower: 
93065 
Enclosed are the originals of three documents: a) a 
Quit-claim Deed regarding the house at 2620 Elizabeth Street in 
Salt Lake City; b) a Quit-claim Deed regarding some recreational 
property in Summit County; and c) a Codicil to your Mother's Will. 
Keep them in a safe place. 
As you know, your Mother wanted.to be sure that you 
receive a 1/2 interest in her property; her intention is to leave 
the other 1/^ to her step-children. There are two possible chain 
of events -- either your Mother dies before her husband does, or 
she dies after he does. If she dies first, you Should promptly, as 
soon as it is possible, record the two deeds with the respective 
County Recorder. If your step-father dies first, I would suggest 
you contact me (after you've discussed matters with your Mother). 
We will need to know whether Dean Crowther did anything to affect 
or alter the ownership or testamentary disposition of his portion 
of the property, before we can decide what needs to be done with 
the Deeds. 
You will have noticed, no doubt, that this letter 
arrived by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested. Acting upon 
your Mother's request, I am forwarding the two Deeds to you, to 
complete the transaction by which she transfers ownership to you. 
The Return Receipt will show that you have* received the two Deeds, 
in case any question of delivery should ever arise. A copy of this 
letter, together with the Return Receipt, is in your Mother's file 
DjLyau 1'iuwer 
Page 2 
December 16, 1988 
here (our #88-02390). Earlier in this letter I asked you to keep 
the documents in a safe place -- please keep this letter with them, 
as an indication of your Mother's intention to deliver the deeds 
and how that was accomplished. 
Please call me if any questions arise. 
Very truly yours, 
W. PAUL WHARTON 
Attorney at Law 
SENIOR CITIZEN LAW CENTER 
WPW/bj 
cc: Nellie D. Crowther 
c/o Mable Hammond 
Enclosures 
Certified Mail Receipt No.: P07 5787592 
FIRST CODICIL TO THE 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF 
NELLIE D. CROWTHER 
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, being at least eighteen years of age, of sound mind and 
memory, and acting under no restraint or duress of any kind, do 
hereby make, publish and declare this instrument to be the FIRST 
CODICIL to my Last Will and Testament executed on the 11th of 
August, 1987, at Salt Lake County, Utah, and do hereby republish 
said Will with the following change: 
The second paragraph of the section entitled "RESIDUARY 
LEGATEES" is revised in its entirety to read as follows: 
In the event that DEAN W. CROWTHER does not survive me, 
I give all of the rest, residue and remainder of my property, 
whether real, personal or mixed, and wherever situated, together 
with any property over which I may have power of appointment to my 
son and step-daughters, named above, as follows: I have by 
Quit-claim Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and other 
real property; I hereby give the other half of each, if I have 
received an interest by the probate of DEAN W. CROWTHER1s estate 
or otherwise, to my three step-daughters* All of the rest of my 
estate I give to the four children, share and share alike. In the 
event that one or more of my children predecease me, each deceased 
child's share of my estate shall be equally divided among that 
child's children. 
G 
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EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT 
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, the Testatrix, sign my name to 
this instrument this /&-cL day of /i c r <, .,. (< i — , 1988, 
and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned 
authority that I sign and execute this instrument as the FIRST 
CODICIL to my Last Will. 
^ '' / t ' r / 
/? We, K3s\-*^<> i.s 
NELLIE D. CROWTHER 
and 
KJ?'/sO!fi&^ J*£/. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 7 ^ ^ ^ / ^ , the witnesses, sign our 
names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby 
declare to the undersigned authority that the Testatrix signs and 
executes this instrument as the FIRST CODICIL to her Last Will and 
that she signs it willingly and that each of us, in the presence 
and hearing of the Testatrix and of each other, hereby signs this 
Codicil as witness to the Testatrix's signing, and that to the 
best of our knowledge the Testatrix is eighteen years of age or 
older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence. 
"7 
In the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, on this 
day of \^- • " •*— V>*<~" / 1988, before me, the undersigned 
Notary, personally appeared NELLIE D. CROWTHER, the Testatrix, 
[] who is personally known by me 
B^° proved to me her identity through documentary evidence in the form of S Y V \ > M ^ . - \v li: > - ^ v *^ r 
to be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document, 
who duly acknowledged to me that she has read and fully 
understands it, executed the same voluntarily and for the purposes 
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set forth, and that she was acting under no constraint or undue 
influence whatsoever. 
Also personally appeared before me the witnesses 
[] who is personally known by me 
riWho proved to me his/her identity through documentary evidence 
^ i n the form of yyy TX- L w^x, <- ^  . ^^^^-A--% ^  , 
and C rxrKc c^^S U . _ Y ^ S > ^ 
[7|^ho is personally known by me 
•
who proved to me his/her identity through documentary evidence 
in the form of , 
to be the persons whose names are signed on the preceding 
document, and who each acknowledged to me that this document is 
signed voluntarily for its stated purpose. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: ^u,c Q^TXr-
3 of 3 L /' //'', (?. 
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When recorded , r e t u r n t o : 
:2 AuGuST 9 i C'l?:? Fn 
K A T I E L „ D I X O N 
RECORDER* SALT Lft^L u>UN~i« UTAH 
BRYAN nOUER 
«0 -• QUIETwOOD LN SAND" LT S4C-: 
RLC Df I GllfiRGH MLCT * DEFUT-
LOJ—i*f-(f uit-Clatm Btth 
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT 
IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE 
NELLIE DEE CROWTHER, Grantor, of 2620 Elizabeth 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to 
BRYAN MOWER, Grantee, of 1564 Acapulco Street, Simi 
Valley, California 93065, for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other 
good and valuable consideration, the following described tract 
of land in -Stewwtit County, State of Utah: 
Lot 7, Block 1, ROCKWOOD SUBDIVISION, 
according to the official plat thereof, 
recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
RESERVING, however, to DEAN W. CROWTHER, a 
lifetime right to occupy the premises. 
of 
This Deed is given to transfer all of 
Grantor's interest in and to the premises 
as well as Grantor's interest in and to 
that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated June 15, 1972, wherein GEORGE K. 
GROVER and SHIRLEY H. GROVER appear as 
Sellers and DEAN W. CROWTHER and NELLIE D. 
CROWTHER appear as Buyers, and recorded 
November 22, 1988, Entry No. 4705045. 
WITNESS the hand of the said grantor this ' *>'<& day 
/Lc 1+ <^>K/<>«- /*—- e 1988. 
/> d v- '*- v C~/ cu.i^7^/ 
NELLIE DEE CROWTHER 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss, 
) 
On the \ ^ day of X^>^, ^ -wS^v 1988, personally 
appeared before me, a Notary Public, NELLIE DEE CROWTHER 
who proved to me her identity through documentary evidence in 
the form of \TV ^ > v ^ ^ \ w,. - \ > V N , S ^ V S - to be 
the person whose name is signed on the preceding document, who 
cU^ Ly '^CKhpwIedged to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: ^yr-
w- ^ \ \ 
CD 
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